State of Utah v.  Jerry L. Martin : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1985
State of Utah v. Jerry L. Martin : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Steven L. Hansen; Attorney for Appellant.
Utah Attorney General; Attorney for Respondent.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Martin, No. 198520490.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1985).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/541
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
JERRY L. MARTIN, 
Defendant /Appellant. 
Case No. 20490 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from the Third Judicial District 
Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
and the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson and 
Dean E. Conder, Judges. 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
Telephone: (801) 533-5261 
Attorney for Respondent 
STEVEN L. HANSEN 
5085 South S t a t e S t r e e t 
Murray, UT 84107 
Telephone: (801) 261-3230 
At torney for Appel lant 
^ « 
MAY 2 91985 
C c,k, Sup; erne Court, Utah 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
JERRY L. MARTIN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20490 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from the Third Judicial District 
Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
and the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson and 
Dean E. Conder, Judges. 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
Telephone: (801) 533-5261 
STEVEN L. HANSEN 
5085 South State Street 
Murray, UT 84107 
Telephone: (801) 261-3230 
Attorney for Respondent Attorney for Appellant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF CONTENTS -- i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
ISSUES PRESENTED - --- iii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 2 
FACTS • 2 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS — -- 10 
ARGUMENT 10 
POINT I - --- 10 
POINT II 14 
CONCLUSION 19 
APPENDIX: 
MOTION FOR DEFENSE OF ENTRAPMENT NOTICE - "A" 
MINUTE ENTRY RULING ON MOTION - "B" 
JURY VERDICT - "C" 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED 
CASES CITED PAGE 
People v. Mclntire, 591 V J.i. 52 7 . Oa I'* '» i 11,13,19 
People v. Moran, 463 P.2d. 763,766 (Ca.1970) 10 
Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 
535 S.Ct. 210, 77 L.Ed. 413 (1932) -- - 15 
State v. Kourbelas, 621 P.2d. 1238 (Ut .1980) - 16,18 
State v. Sprague, 680 P.2d.404 (Ut.1984) 16 ,17 ,18 
State v. Taylor, 599 P.2d.446 (Ut.1979) 15 ,16 ,18 
United States v. Klosterman, 248 F.2d. 191,195-196 
(3rd Cir . 1951) 12 
OTHER AUTHORITY 
UTAH CODE ANN. §76-2-303, 1953, as amended 13,14 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
Whether manipulation of a private third party by a 
law enforcement officer to procure the commission of 
a criminal offense by another renders the third party 
a government agent for purposes of the entrapment defense 
even though the third party remains unaware of the law 
enforcement object. 
Whether Appellant as a matter of law was entrapped by 
authorities, through his friend, Toby Wells, into 
committing the offense in question and whether, on that 
account, this Court should reverse the jury verdict and 
acquit the Appellant of the crime charged. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
JERRY L. MARTIN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20490 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On the 28th day of November, 1984, defendant/appellant, 
Jerry L. Martin, was convicted of the offense of Unlawful 
Distribution for Value of a Controlled Substance after a jury 
trial was had on the charges. Defendant was sentenced on the 
14th day of January by the Honorable Jay E. Banks, Third District 
Court Judge. Thereafter, Martin filed a Notice of Appeal on 
February 8, 1985, as well as a Docketing Statement. For purposes 
of this appeal, Jerry L. Martin, defendant/appellant will be 
referred to as Martin. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Appellant petitions this Court to overturn the 
Jury Verdict and rule as a matter of law that Martin is not 
guilty, by way of entrapment, and also that this Court judicially 
recognize that the defense of entrapment does apply where the 
government uses a private individual, even though the individual 
is not aware of it, as an agent or accessory for entrapping a 
third party, i.e., Martin. Therefore, this Court should reverse 
the Minute Entry Order of April 27, 1984, which denied Appellant 
the right to assert the defense of entrapment and should rule 
that the Appellant here was entrapped as a matter of law and fact. 
FACTS 
Toby Wells (hereinafter referred to as Wells) and 
Defendant/Appellant Jerry Martin (hereinafter referred to as 
Martin) were friends prior to the times in question and used 
to double-date quite often (T.145,L.1-3). In the past Martin 
had loaned Wells money to pay rent, buy gas, and on occasion 
Wells had lent Martin money (T.145, L.6-8). Further, Wells 
admitted that prior to the times in question he had been at 
Martin's house several times, that Martin had been at his house 
several times and that their wives were very close friends and, 
in fact, that Martin had loaned money to Well's wife. (T.96). 
In about August 1982, or October 1982, depending upon 
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whose story is believed, Wells was introduced to Charles Hafen, 
a West Valley City police officer with narcotics investigation 
division (hereafter referred to as Hafen) by an undercover 
officer, Barbara Mann, who had become a girlfriend of Wells 
who referred to Hafen as her brother (T.49,L.24; T.99, L.7). 
From the point where Hafen met Wells, it is best to 
let the parties tell their won story by summarizing their 
testimony as brought at trial. 
Hafen testified as to the facts as follows: 
Charlie Hafen, a police officer for West Valley, Utah, 
stated that when he first met Toby Wells he (Hafen) was not 
sure who first brought up the question of cocaine (T.p.20, L.16). 
Then a little later Hafen admitted that it was he (Hafen) who 
first proposed to Toby Wells that he wanted to find some cocaine, 
"to basically go into the cocaine trade with.1' "So it was me 
that first spoke to Toby about it." (T.p.21, LL.3-6). 
T.p.22, LL. 17-20: 
"Q. Did you make any arrangements with Toby 
as to what his part would be in the deal? 
A. It was basically agreed that he was to arrange 
the sale, be sure that it was quality- cocaine. 
Hafen stated that he was going to pay Toby Wells for 
setting up the deal, by giving him "an ounce" of cocaine. (T. 
p.22, L.24). On or about October 18, 1982, Hafen bought 1 gram 
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of cocaine from Wells (T .49 ,L .19 ) . Hafen admitted that on the 
18th of October, 1982, at the time of the a l l e g e d f i r s t buy of 
an ounce of cocaine , he (Hafen) showed Wells about $16,000.00 
in c a s h . ( T . 2 3 , LL.14-15) . 
Hafen s t a t e d that he t o l d Wells that he had $35,000.00 
and that he had got ten i t from "doing grocery s tore and bank 
robberies in the Intermountain area." (T .27 ,LL.7-8) . 
Hafen further s t a t e d that he spoke with Wells about 
e ight or nine times on the telephone between the 6th and 27th 
of October, 1982. (T.50,LL.12-13) and that he saw Wells in person 
on the 6th , the day of the 18th, the afternoon of the 18th and 
on the 27th (T.50,LL.16-17) and that the informant, Barbara Mann, 
may a l so have ta lked with him (T.50,LL.20-21) . 
Hafen admitted that on severa l occas ions he t o l d Wells 
that he was out of State (T.52,LL.15-17) and that he did not 
remember in which calls he s a i d that (T.52, LL 10-14) . 
"A. I am not sure i f I can remember. There were so 
many c a l l s that we made, some of them j u s t 
b a s i c a l l y e s t a b l i s h i n g a somewhat f r i end ly 
working r e l a t i o n s h i p . I am not sure i f I r e -
c a l l e x a c t l y when I s a i d I was in State and 
out of S t a t e . " 
Hafen s t a t e d he maybe spoke with Wells ten or twelve times by 
phone. (T.52 ,LL.22-23) . 
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At the time Hafen bought the gram of cocaine from 
Toby Wells, he admitted showing him either $15,000 or $16,000. 
(T.57,LL.l-2). Hafen stated that at the time he (Hafen) bought 
the gram from Wells, he gave Wells the option of having one 
ounce of cocaine or the sum of $2,000 to $2,500.00.(T.57,LL. 
14-18). Hafen stated he didn't know what representations Wells 
made to Jerry Martin or how many times Wells called Martin. 
(T.60, L.3; T.60, L.10). 
Toby Wells' testimony can be outlined as follows: 
Toby Wells said that he became acquainted with Hafen 
prior to October 6, 1982, and that he (Wells) remembers it as 
being in August, 1982.(T.97,L.6,L.13). 
Wells stated that Mr. Hafen had talked with him on 
the night that he had first met him and that Hafen had told 
Wells that he (Hafen) "was from Denver" and that he was "trying 
to break away from some dealings in there and starting his own 
here in Salt Lake." (T.100,LL.19-21). 
Wells stated that he met with Hafen several days 
later at the Main Event (T.101,LL.6-8), and that around that 
time Hafen "was always calling, leaving messages, if I wasn't 
at work, at my mother's".(T.102,LL7-8) and that on the phone 
Hafen first asked Wells about purchasing a gram for Hafen (T. 
102,LL.9-15), and that this gram was to be just a sample, 
(t.102,LL.18-23). 
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Wells stated that he contacted Jerry Martin among 
other people around that time, but Jerry Martin didn't contact 
him (Wells) back. (T.103,104 LL.1-2). Wells further stated 
that Hafen was "constantly calling11. (T.104,L.18) and that 
he told Hafen that he (Wells) could not do anything because 
he didn't have the money. Hafen then gave Wells $140.00 to 
purchase Hafen a gram of cocaine.(T.105,L.2) which Wells did, 
but not from Martin.(T.105,LL.2-6). 
About the same time as the purchase of the gram of 
cocaine, Hafen showed Wells a bag containing $12,000.00.(T.105, 
LL.15-17). Wells stated that Hafen had shown him this same 
amount on at least one prior occasion (T.107,LL.4-5). 
Sometime later, Hafen told Wells that he was leaving 
town for several weeks and that he would contact Wells (T.108, 
LL.14-16) which he did, stating that he (Hafen) "was collecting 
the money from people that owe him money" (T.108,LL.20-21) and 
that Hafen now wanted to get a pound (T.108,L.25). 
Wells stated that shortly after these conversations 
he called Jerty Martin again and told Martin that Hafen was 
out of town collecting money. But again Martin told Wells "no." 
Wells kept asking Martin and finally Martin said that "he would 
look and see."(T.109,L.13). 
Wells received some more calls from Hafen, this time 
with Hafen stating that he was calling "from California."(T.110, 
L.6). 
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Wells testified that he then called Martin again 
and told him that they had some money and they wanted a pound. 
(T.110,LL.23-24). 
Wells testified further that shortly thereafter, Hafen 
said that he was back in town and showed Wells $35,000.00 in 
cash. Wells stated that he contacted Martin but, "Jerry said 
that he was very hesitant."(T.Ill,LL.19-25). Martin said, "No, 
I will check and see what I can do.M(T.112,6-7); and then Martin 
did not call Wells back.(T.112,LL.8-9). Wells contacted Martin 
again the next evening and then called Martin again later.(T.113). 
Even when Hafen finally went out to Martin's house, 
according to Wells1 testimony, Jerry Martin still stated, ffNo, 
I don't feel like I want to do this." (T.115,LL.20-21). Accord-
ing to Wells, Hafen shoved the money into Martin's face and 
said, "No, we went through all this trouble. You are not going 
to back out now."(T.115,LL.23-24), and Hafen grabbed Martin as 
Martin started walking away and swung him around.(T.116,LL.1-2). 
Wells stated that from August to October 27, 1982, 
Hafen saw Wells personally more than ten times.(T.117,L.23) a n^ 
that there were countless telephone calls, sometimes three or 
four a day. (T.118,LL.2-3) , and that Hafen told him he would 
give him (Wells) $2,500.00 and some of the cocaine following 
up the buy. (T.118,LL.9^16). Hafen instructed Wells as to 
what to tell his source, that he (Wells) had seen the $12,000.00 
and how much cocaine Hafen wanted to buy.(T.119-120). 
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The appellant's testimony was somewhat along the 
lines of the testimony of Wells. Martin, the appellant, stated 
that he was a roofer earning about $14,000 annually, and that 
he earned another $4,000 annually farming ten acres for his 
86 year old father and 83 year old mother.(T.143-144). 
Martin stated that when Wells was attempting to pur-
chase an ounce of cocaine that Wells asked him, but that he 
never did try because he did not intend to do it (T.147,LL.12-19), 
and that later Wells began calling him, sometimes "every other 
day, sometimes every day11, during the two-three month period 
in question (T.148,LL.4-6), and that Wells later said that the 
people have more money, and that Wells now wanted Martin to 
obtain a quarter or three-quarters of a pound of cocaine.(T.148, 
LL.10-12). Martin still did not call Wells back.(T.148,LL.19-20). 
Again, Wells began his persistent calling of Martin, 
mentioning now a sum of $12,000.00 and Martin states that he 
did this !fquite often for a weekM (T. 148,L. 25) . Thereafter, 
Wells visited Martin in person, saying that "they wanted a pound" 
and have $30,000.00 (T.149,LL.9-12). Martin finally contacted 
a man known as Chip (Doug Pexton) (T.157), whom Martin had met 
playing pool. Chip said that he would probably get Martin a 
pound of cocaine for $20,000.00 (T.150). Martin still did not 
contact Wells, but Wells called Martin again and stated that 
they have $35,000.00.(T.151). Martin then called Chip who took 
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a pound of cocaine to Martin's and told Martin that he had 
better have the money to him the next day or something might 
happen to his home or his family.(T.152). 
When Hafen arrived that evening (about October 28, 
1982), Martin told him that he had told Toby Wells that he 
"wasn't going to do it". (T.153,LL9-10;LL.13-15). Hafen 
grabbed him (Martin) and pulled him around and said that he 
had gone to a lot of trouble to put this deal together and 
that Martin was "not going to punk out on me nox*." (T.153, 
LL.17-20). When Hafen grabbed him and pulled him around, he 
felt a solid object in Hafen1s pocket which he assumed to be 
a gun.(T.153,LL.21-25), and that he (Martin) fearfully went 
ahead with the transaction. 
Martin estimated that during the entire two-three 
month period in question, he received over fifty telephone 
calls from Wells, almost daily and sometimes twice a day, but 
that during this time he "never called Toby once", and that 
Wells also came out to his house three or four times. (T.155, 
LL.9-17). 
After a jury trial, Martin was found guilty of 
Unlawful Distribution for Value of a Controlled Substance, 
on November 28, 1984. On January 14, 1985, Martin was sen-
tenced to a term in the Utah State Prison for a period of 
"not less than one year nor more than fifteen years." 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Appellant Martin's argument for purposes of this 
appeal is briefly as follows: 
Appellant will show that Toby Wells, due to his 
manipulation by law enforcement officers was made a government 
agent, albeit an unknowing one, for purposes of entrapping 
Appellant Martin. 
That as a matter of law, as developed in Utah, 
the Appellant was entrapped, and that this entrapment consti-
tutes grounds for this Court to overturn the jury verdict and 
to acquit Appellant without the necessity of a new trial. 
POINT ONE 
APPELLANT REQUESTS THE SUPREME COURT TO ADOPT 
THE RULE THAT, AS HERE, MANIPULATION OF A THIRD 
PARTY BY A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER TO PROCURE 
THE COMMISSION OF A CRIMINAL OFFENSE BY ANOTHER 
RENDERS THE THIRD PARTY A GOVERNMENT AGENT FOR 
PURPOSES OF THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE EVEN THOUGH 
THE THIRD PARTY REMAINS UNAWARE OF THE LAW EN-
FORCEMENT OBJECT. 
The California position is that one can be manipulated 
by a government officer and thereby become an agent of the 
government for purposes of entrapment, even though such person 
is unaware that the one with whom he is dealing is a government 
officer. 
In the case of People v. Moran, 463 P.2d. 763, 766 
(Cal.,EnBank,1970) the Court intimated that it was leaning 
toward this view with regard to entrapment. 
"The trial Court properly instructed 
the jury that if the crime was suggested 
by another person, whether or not a law 
enforcement officer, for the purpose of 
entranment the defendant is not liable.11 
The seminal case, however, was that of People v. 
Mclntire, 591 P.2d.527 (Cal. 1979). In Mclntire, an undercover 
police officer, through repeated entreaties and otherwise, per-
suaded a high-school youth from a troubled family to persuade 
his sister to obtain some marijuana for him. The Court there 
concluded that the brother was an unknowing agent of the police 
for purpose of his sister asserting an entrapment defense. 
There was substantial evidence from which 
the jury could have concluded that defend-
ant was not involved in drug traffic and 
never had been; that she did not want to 
participate in the transaction herein, but 
acquiesced after constant urging by her 
younger brother because of sympathy aroused 
by family problems; and that the importun-
ing from her brother was the direct result 
of strong and persistent pressure brought 
to bear by an undercover police agent. 
Such police conduct -- manipulating an im-
pressionable high school youth from a 
troubled family and using him to pressure 
his sister into committing a crime she was 
neither predisposed to nor desired to 
commit — constitutes precisely the sort 
of improper fostering of crime the entrapment 
defense is intended to prevent. 
The trial court apparently accepted the 
prosecution claim that entrapment cannot be 
effected through an unwitting agent; because 
defendant's brother was not aware that the 
person importuning him to obtain marijuana 
from his sister was a police officer, the 
pressure he applied in turn to defendant was 
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not for the purpose of entraping her and 
and the defense was therefore unavailable. 
If such were the law, unconscionable law 
enforcement activity would be permitted 
so long as the target of entrapping agents 
was not reached directly but indirectly 
through the use of unsuspecting dupes. 
Nothing in the doctrine of entrapment re-
quires us to allow by indirection such an 
irrational and dysfunctional result. 
The purposes of the entrapment defense can 
be fulfilled only if it is understood that 
one can act as the agent of a law enforce-
ment official without realizing the identity 
of his principal; the unwitting agent, 
though he may not appreciate the true nature 
of his role, is nonetheless being manipula-
ted as the officer's tool in a plan to foster 
a crime and entrap its perpetrator. In 
Patty v. Board of Medical Examiners (1973), 
9 Cal.3d 356,364 107 Cal.Rptr. 473,478-79, 
508 P.2d 1121, 1126-27, we recognize that 
"The function of . . . enforcement officials 
to investigate, not instigate, crime; to 
discover, not to promote, crime.11 Improper 
governmental instigation of crime is not 
immunized because it is effected indirectly 
through a pliable medium. 
Case law from other jurisdictions supports 
our conclusion that manipulation of a third 
party by law enforcement officers to procure 
the commission of a criminal offense by 
another renders the third party a government 
agent for purposes of the entrapment defense, 
even though the third party remains unaware 
of the law enforcement object. As one com-
mentator has observed, "Despite his lack of 
intent to secure the defendant's arrest, his 
agency in such a situation seems apparent." 
(Note, Entrapment (1960) 73 Harv.L.Rev. 1333, 
1342.) Thus, in United States v. Klosterman 
(3d Cir.1951) 248 P.2d 191,195-196, the court 
reversed the conviction of one defendant, 
Stafford, because his codefendant, Deeney, 
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had induced him to commit the offense at 
the urging of a law enforcement officer, 
King: "Deeney became King's agent for 
the purpose of entrapping Stafford." (Id. 
at p.196; see also United States v. Mathues 
E.D.Pa.1927) 22 F.2d 979; Johnson v. United 
States (1963), 115 U.S.App.D.C. 63,64-65, 
317 F.2d 127,128-129; id. 115U.S.App.D.C. 
at p.69, 317 F.2d at p. 133 (dis.opn. by 
Bastian, J.).) _ld> &t 53Q 
The Utah law on the defense of entrapment, Ut. 
C.Ann., 76-2-303, 1953, as amended, does not particularly 
discuss instances such as that in Mclntire (supra), but the 
language of the statute is broad enough that it should encom-
pass such. Ut.C.Ann. 76-2-303(1) states: 
76-2-303. Entrapment. - (1) It is a 
defense that the actor was entrapped into 
committing the offense. Entrapment occurs 
when a law enforcement officer or a person 
Hirected by or acting in co-operation with 
the officer induces the commission of an 
offense in order to obtain evidence of the 
commission for prosecution by methods creat-
ing a substantial risk that the offense would 
be committed by one not otherwise ready to 
commit it. Conduct merely affording a per-
son an opportunity to commit an offense does 
not constitute entrapment. (Emphasis added) 
The statute goes on to provide, Ut.C.Ann. 76-2-303 (4)&(5): 
04) Upon written motion of the defendant, 
the court shall hear evidence on the issue 
and shall determine as a matter of fact and 
law whether the defendant was entrapped to 
commit the offense. Defendant's motion shall 
be made at least ten days before trial except 
the court for good cause shown may permit a 
later filing. 
(5) Should the court determine that the 
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defendant was entrapped, it shall dismiss 
the case with prejudice, but if the court 
determines the defendant was not entrapped, 
such issue may be presented by the defendant 
to the jury at trial. Any order by the 
court dismissing a case based on entrapment 
shall be appealable by the state.1' 
In the instant case, appellant's then attorney, Galen 
Ross, filed a Motion to Suppress, at least ten days prior to 
the trial and a hearing on it was held on or about the 27th day 
of April, 1984, before Judge Homer Wilkinson, a Judge of the 
Third District Court. On April 27, 1984, the Court, in a 
Minute Entry, denied the defendant-appellantfs Motion. 
Appellant urges this Court to rule as a matter of law 
that appellant Martin's close friend had become an agent of the 
State for purposes of entrapment and, further, that this Court 
review the facts as set out in the record and rule as a matter 
of law and fact that entrapment occurred here, thus reversing 
the Minute Entry of April 27, 1984. 
POINT TWO 
BASED ON A STUDY OF THE UTAH LAW OF ENTRAPMENT 
AND THE FACTS OF THIS CASE, IT IS CLEAR THAT 
APPELLANT WAS ENTRAPPED BY HIS FRIEND, TOBY TOLLS 
WHO WAS A DEFACTO POLICE AGENT, INTO COMMITTING 
THE OFFENSE IN QUESTION; AND, THEREFORE, 
THIS COURT OUGHT TO REVERSE THE JURY VERDICT 
HERE AND ACQUIT THE APPELLANT OF THE CRIME 
CHARGED. 
Prior to 1979, this Court adopted a subjective test 
for purpose of determining the issue of entrapment. In State v. 
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Taylor, 599 P.2d. 496 (Ut.1979) this Court change its position 
and said that in conformity with the Utah Code provisions on 
entrapment, which were adopted from the Model Penal Code, it 
was clear that this Court should apply an objective test to fact 
situations. In Taylor, at 503, it then states the method for 
applying an objective test: 
"In assessing police conduct under the 
objective standard, the test to determine 
an unlawful entrapment is whether a law 
enforcement official or an agent, in order 
to obtain evidence of the commission, in-
duced the defendant to commit such an 
offense by persuasion or inducement which 
would be effective to persuade an average 
person, other than one who was merely given 
the opportunity to commit the offense. 
Extreme pleas of desparate illness or 
appeals based primarily on sympathy, pity, 
or close personal friendship, or offers of 
inordinate sums of money, are examples, de-
pending on an evaluation of the circumstances 
in each case of what might constitute pro-
hibited conduct.11 
Taylor, cites with approval the United States Supreme Court case 
of Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 53 S.Ct. 210, 77 L.Ed. 
413 (1932). In Sorrells, 77 L.Ed. 413, at 416-417, the Court 
stated: 
It is well settled that the fact that 
officers or employees of the Government 
merely afford opportunities or facilities 
for the commission of the offense does not 
defeat the prosecution. Artifice and 
stratagem may be employed to catch those 
engaged in criminal enterprises. 
(Extensive Citations). The appropriate 
object of this permitted activity, frequently 
essential to the enforcement of the law, is 
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to reveal the criminal design; to expose 
the illicit traffic, the prohibited pub-
lication, the fraudulent use of the mails, 
the illegal conspiracy, or other offenses, 
and thus disclose the would-be violators 
of the law. A different question is 
presented when the criminal design origin-
ates with the officials of the Government 
and they implant in the mind of an inno-
cent person the disposition to commit the 
alleged offense and induce its commission 
in order that they may prosecute.tf 
In State v. Taylor, supra, the Court found as a matter 
of law there was entrapment where defendant and an undercover 
police officer were very close friends (cohabitating at one 
point) and where the undercover agent used that friendship to 
induce defendant to make a final buy of heroin for her, for 
which defendant was convicted. 
In the two recent cases of State v. Kourbelas, 621 P.2d. 
1238 (Ut.1980), and State v. Sprague, 680 P.2d. 404 (Ut. 1984), 
this Court reversed convictions of Distribution of a Controlled 
Substance for Value, where many less contacts were made with 
the defendants than were made by officer Hafen through his inter-
mediary Toby Wells with appellant Jerry Martin. 
In State v. Kourbelas, supra, the undercover officer 
contacted the defendant, once in person, callad defendant about 
two weeks later (which call defendant did not return), called 
defendant two more times, thereby arranging the buy. The Court, 
in reversing the conviction, stated, at 1240: 
f!These facts are significant: that it 
was Mr. Nelson who first suggested the pur-
chase of marijuana from the defendant; that 
after two weeks had passed it was he who 
renewed the contact and the request, which 
he followed up by calling the defendant at 
least five times in attempting to purchase 
the marijuana. This is to be considered 
together with the fact that there is no 
evidence that the defendant had previously 
possessed or dealt in the drug ... 
"It is our opinion that, if the rule as 
to the presumption of innocence is fairly 
and properly applied, there necessarily 
exists a reasonable doubt as to whether the 
offense committed was the product of the 
defendant's initiative and desire, or was 
induced by the persistent requests of Mr. 
Nelson. Accordingly, it is our conclusion 
that the defendant's convistion should be 
reversed.11 
In State v. Sprague, 680 P.2d.404 (Ut.1984) this 
Court also reversed a conviction for Distribution of a Controlled 
Substance for Value. In the Sprague case, the undercover officer 
merely approached the defendant on three occasions in person ask-
ing defendant if he could obtain some marijuana for the officer. 
The undercover officer initiated the conversation on the first 
occasion and took the initiative in making the contacts on the 
next two occasions. The Court reversed on the issue of entrap-
ment, and in its decision stated: 
"Defendant relies on State v. Kourbelas, 
in arguing that he was entrapped. That reli-
ance is well-placed. In Kourbelas, on facts 
markedly similar to those in this case, the 
Court said that there existed 'a reasonable 
doubt as to whether the offense committed was 
the product of the defendant's initiative and 
desire, or was induced by the persistent re-
quests of (the undercover agent).' 
"That language applies in this case as well. 
It was Tauffer who first approached defendant, 
with no reason to believe that defendant used 
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or sold drugs. After a week had passed, 
it was again Tauffer who approached de-
fendant with the request f<?r marijuana, 
which defendant did not provide. Finally, 
after Tauffer approached defendant a third 
time, defendant provided a gram of marijuana 
to Tauffer. Defendant testified that he did 
this because he wanted to be a friend to 
Tauffer." 
"Therefore, we conclude that the offense 
was induced by the persistent requests of 
Tauffer, not by the initiative and desire of 
defendant.ff 
In the instant case, the fact situation is even more 
extreme than that of either the Sprague or Kourbelas cases 
discussed above. Here, the undercover narcotic agent, Hafen, 
had made repeated in-person contact as well as anywhere from 
20 to 50 or more telephone calls to Wells who, in turn, persis-
tant ly contacted Appellant Martin, at times even twice a day, 
for a period of two months. Further, Hafen raised the amount 
for the buy from $12,000, to $20,000, to $30,000, and finally, 
to $35,000. Prior to the amounts of $30,000 and $35,000 being 
discussed, Martin, the Appellant, did not show interest in 
arranging a cocaine buy, nor did he bother to contact Wells back 
even though Wells was a friend of both Appellant and his wife. 
In State v. Taylor, supra, this Court stated that two of the 
indices which would tend to indicate entrapment are personal 
friendship and offers of large sums of money, both of which 
were factors here. 
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Here, Appe l l an t r e q u e s t s t h i s Court t o fo l low t h e 
view i n t h e M c l n t i r e ca se , sup ra , which h e l d t h a t an i n d i v i d u a l 
can become an agent fo r purposes of entrapment where he i s 
man ipu la ted by a p o l i c e o f f i c e r , even where t h e i n d i v i d u a l i s 
unaware of such. This case i s suppor ted by t h e language of 
U t a h ' s entrapment s t a t u t e , Utah Code Annota ted , §76-2-303. 
Appe l l an t contends t h a t Toby Wells was an agent of 
t he n a r c o t i c d i v i s i o n and O f f i c e r Hafen h e r e fo r a l l i n t e n t s 
and purposes and t h a t We l l s ' a c t i o n s v i s - a - v i s Appe l lan t Mar t in 
c o n s t i t u t e d ent rapment as a m a t t e r of law. 
CONCLUSION-
Based on t h e fo rego ing , Appe l l an t r e q u e s t s t h i s Court 
t o r e v e r s e t h e Minute Entry d e c i s i o n of t h e lower c o u r t , da ted 
A p r i l 27 , 1984, as w e l l as t h e Ju ry V e r d i c t and t o r u l e as a 
m a t t e r of t h e f a c t s h e r e and t h e Utah law of entrapment t h a t 
Appe l l an t was en t r apped and, t h e r e f o r e , ought t o be a c q u i t t e d 
of t he crime charged. 
DATED t h i s J ? t y ^ d a y of May, 1985. 
R e s p e c t f u l l y submi t t ed , 
orney for Defendant /Appel lan t 
HAROLD L. WHITNEY / 
At torney for Defendant /Appel lan t 
GALEN ROSS 
Attorney for Defendant 
1303 Wasatch Drive 
Salt Lake City UT 84108 
Gait Lcko C o w * ' Utah 
APRIfc 1984 
H. Dixffi Kndley, C.c;\^rJ Dist..Cour 
By . - ,. . , *. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plantiff, 
vs. 
JERRY L. MARTIN 
Defendant 
NOTICE OF HEARING OF 
NOTICE OF INTENT TO RELY 
ON DEFENSE OF ENTRAPMENT 
Case No. CR 83-809 
TO THE SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY AND THE CLERK OF THE COURT: 
You and each of you please take notice that the above entitled matter 
will come on regularly for hearing on the 27th day of April, 1984, at the 
hour of 2:00 p.m. before the Honorable Homer Wilkinson, ^ Judge, Third District 
Court. Please govern yourselves accordingly. 
DATED this jC? day of April, 1984. 
*-<Ic ^ 
Galen Ross ^ — 
Attorney for Defendant 
DELIVERED/MAILED a copy of the foregoing Notice to Paul Payden of the 
Salt Lake County Attorney's Office, 231 East Fourt South, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, 84111, this /& day of April, 1984. 
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In the District Court ol the Third Judicial Districtu o«putycierk 
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
JERRY 
SUSAN 
L. 
V*. 
MARTIN 
ARMIJO, r 
and 
Plaintiff 
Defendant 
VERDICT 
Caae No. CR 83-809 
fe, tbe Jurors iapaneled ia the above case, fis* .„.ii^-.^l^la..nl.<._ 
Jerry L. Martin, Guilty of Unlawful Dist r ibut ion For Value of 
a Controlled Substance as charged in the Information. 
Dated JJML 3A 19
 r._ 
re«iM*M 
APPENDIX 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed four copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellant, postage prepaid, to the Utah 
State Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building, 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114, this £ffi day of May, 19 85 
X T HANSEN 
Attorney for Appellant 
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